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REVISED RULE 277-A BETTER SPECIAL VERDICT
SYSTEM FOR TEXAS
by
Jack Pope* and William G. Lowerre**
T HE Texas Supreme Court's revision of rule 2771 which became effective
September 1, 1973, marks the first major change in the manner for the
submission of jury issues since 1913.2 Hopefully the burdens on jurors, prac-
titioners, and the courts will be lightened by the change. The effective date
for the revised rule coincided with the effective date for the adoption of
comparative negligence3 in Texas, and the two reforms should simplify tri-
als in a great number of cases. This Article is written with two purposes
in mind: (1) to explain the probable nature of the changes in the practice
which will flow from the revision, and (2) to discourage the importation
of former practices, especially in the area of negligence law, into the new
system. The revised rule commences:
In all jury cases the court may submit said cause upon special issues
without request of either party, and, upon request of either party,
shall submit the cause upon special issues controlling the disposition
of the case that are raised by the written pleadings and the evidence
in the case, except that, for good cause subject to review or on agree-
ment of the parties, the court may submit the same on a general
charge.4
The quoted portion of the rule means that the special verdict will be the
dominant mode of jury submission in Texas. Sound reasons support the spe-
cial verdict practice as a fairer method of trial than that afforded by the
general charge. Professor Sunderland wrote in 1920:
The peculiarity of the general verdict is the merger into a single
indivisible residuum of all matters, however numerous, whether of law
or fact. It is a compound made by the jury which is incapable of being
broken up into its constituent parts. No judicial reagents exist for
either a qualitative or a quantitative analysis. The law supplies the
means for determining neither what facts were found, nor what prin-
ciples of law were applied, nor how the application was made. There
are therefore three unknown elements which enter into the general
verdict: (a) the facts; (b) the law; (c) the application of the law
* B.A., Abilene Christian College; LL.B., University of Texas. Associate Justice,
Supreme Court of Texas.
** B.A., Trinity University; J.D., University of Texas. Attorney at Law, Houston,
Texas.
ITEX. R. Civ. P. 277.
2 In 1913 the Texas Legislature established the Texas special issue practice by pro-
viding, in part, that "[i]n all jury cases the court, upon request of either party, shall
submit the cause upon special issues raised by the pleadings and the evidence in the
case." Ch. 59, § 1, [1913] Tex. Laws 113.
3 Ch. 28, § 1, [1973] Tex. Laws 41.
4 TEx. R. Civ. P. 277.
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to the facts. And it is clear that the verdict is liable to three sources
of error, corresponding to these three elements. . . . No one but
the jurors can tell what was put into it [the general verdict] and thejurors will not be heard to say. The general verdict is as inscrutable
and ,ssentially mysterious as the judgment which issued from the an-
cient oracle of Delphi. Both stand on the same foundation-a pre-
sumption of wisdom.5
The same view more recently was expressed by Chief Judge Brown of the
Fifth Circuit in a concurring opinion that criticized the federal practice which
resulted in a remand of a cause for another trial.6 He urged the judges
of the courts in the circuit to "take a page from the book of their brothers
in Texas by using that remarkable tool, F.R.Civ.P. 49(a). '7 The opinion
continued, "a case that could be disposed of by a simple rendition had spe-
cial interrogatories been employed, goes back for a second, and wholly
needless trial." Judge Brown said that the special verdict system is not
only a doubt eliminator but also a waste eliminator. The superiority of the
special verdict over the general charge appears to be the view of most
of the scholars who have compared the systems. 9
The special verdict originated sometime during the twelfth century. It
was an invention of the common law, and it came in response to the de-
mands of jurors that they be required only to answer questions of fact,
leaving the doom to the bench.' 0 Jurors were thus shielded from the pen-
alties of the attaint. Six centuries later, article VII of Plans and Pow-
ers of the Provisional Government of Texas, adopted November 13, 1835,
provided for jury trials in all cases," and the First Congress of the Provi-
sional Government of Texas passed an Act Establishing the Jurisdiction
and Powers of the District Courts.12  Section 46 of that Act provided that
the jury "shall report in their verdict all the material facts of the case
.. . . - Then, on January 25, 1841, the Fifth Congress passed an act
empowering the judges of district courts to submit issues of fact to a jury in
chancery cases whereby the judge could "order issues of fact to be made up
and submitted to a jury empaneled for that purpose . . . . 14 The founda-
tion for the special verdict was laid.
5 Sunderland, Verdicts, General and Special, 29 YALE L.J. 253, 258 (1920).
6 Jones v. Petroleum Carrier Corp., 483 F.2d 1369 (5th Cir. 1973).
7 Id. at 1372.
8 Id.
9 See, e.g., Skidmore v. Baltimore & 0. Ry., 167 F.2d 54 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
335 U.S. 816 (1948); Brown, Federal Special Verdicts: The Doubt Eliminator, 44
F.R.D. 338 (1967); Denton, Informing a Jury of the Legal Effect of Its Answers, 2
ST. MARY'S L.J. 1 (1970); Driver, A More Extended Use of the Special Verdict, 9
F.R.D. 495 (1949); Green, A New Development in Jury Trial, 13 A.B.A.J. 715 (1927);
McCormick, Jury Verdicts upon Special Questions in Civil Cases, 2 F.R.D. 176 (1941);
Nordbye, Use of Special Verdicts Under Rules of Civil Procedure, 2 F.R.D. 138 (1941);
Sunderland, supra note 5; Wright, The Use of Special Verdicts in Federal Court, 38
F.R.D. 199 (1965).
10 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 630 (2d ed. 1898).
11 J. SAYLES, THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE STATE OF TEXAS 142 (3d ed. 1888).
12 [1836] Tex. Laws 198, 1 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 1258 (1898).
13 [1836] Tex. Laws 211, 1 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 1271 (1898).
14 An Act To Regulate the Granting and Trial of Injunctions, and To Empower the
Judges of the District Courts To Submit Issues of Fact to a Jury in Chancery Cases §
7, [1841] Tex. Laws 84, 2 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 548 (1898).
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The First Legislature of the State of Texas included in its laws a provision
for the special verdict in civil cases. It was provided that "the jury may
find and return a special verdict in writing, in issues made up under the
direction of the court . . ... 15 The revision of the statutes in 1879 found
a refinement in the provisions for the special verdict. The statutes defined
both the general1 6 and the special' 7 verdicts and it was provided that "[t]he
special verdict must find the facts as established by the evidence, and not the
evidence by which they are established, and the findings must be such as
that nothing remains for the court but to draw from such facts the conclu-
sions of law.' 8
Finally, in 1913 article 1984a was passed, 19 which was destined to be-
come, with but very little change, the basis for the submission of special
issues in Texas until September 1, 1973.20 For the first time, a party could
demand that his case be submitted upon special issues, thereby no longer
leaving the mode of submission of his case solely to the discretion of the
trial court as had previously been the rule.2 ' Unfortunately, article 1984a
contained the language that "[s]uch special issues shall be submitted dis-
tinctly and separately, and without being intermingled with each other, so
that each issue may be answered by the jury separately." That phrase in-
troduced a system of fractionization of special issues far beyond that em-
ployed in any other jurisdiction in the common-law world.
Rule 277 carried the phrase forward into the 1941 Rules of Civil Proce-
dure and, though often criticized, few attempts were made to correct the
rule. Perhaps the strongest attempt was made at the Supreme Court Ad-
visory Committee conference of April 22 1949. Franklin Jones of Mar-
shall proposed the repeal of rules 277-279 and the adoption of a rule
similar to the federal rule 49. Professor Robert W. Stayton, on the other
hand, advocated a continuance of rule 277 with modifications, the most
important of which would have required that "all issues should be submitted
in plain and simple language," and that the burden of proof be eliminated
from the framing of the issue. The victorious opposition to both these pro-
posed changes was led by Roy McDonald. He stated the following reason
for his opposition to the adoption of the federal rule:
In effect this proposal would return Texas to the general charge, or to
the general charge supplemented by special issues. We are presum-
ably not yet ready to adopt in Texas the federal practice which per-
mits the judge to array the evidence. . . . To adopt Federal Rule 49
while still restraining our trial judges from commenting on the evi-
'5 An Act To Regulate Proceedings in the District Courts § 108, [1846] Tex. Laws
392, 2 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 1698 (1898).16 "A general verdict is one whereby the jury pronounce generally in favor of one
or more parties to the suit upon all or any of the issues submitted to them." Tex.
Civ. Stat. art. 1329 (1879).
17 "A special verdict is one wherein the jury find the facts only on issues made up
and submitted to them under the direction of the court." Tex. Civ. Stat. art. 1330
(1879).
18 Tex. Civ. Stat. art. 1331 (1879).
19 Ch. 59, § 1, [1913] Tex. Laws 113.
20 The effective date of the newly promulgated TEx. R. Civ. P. 277.
21 Tex. Civ. Stat. art. 1333 (1879).
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dence would be inviting greater confusion than exists at present. I
have been told by older lawyers . . . that the special issue practice
was adopted because it was virtually impossible to prepare a general
charge in a complicated case which would stand up on appeal. Our
present bar is largely unfamiliar with the general charge in civil cases
and the proposal would in my opinion create turmoil. 22
I. THE "DISTINCTLY AND SEPARATELY" RULE
I-AS BEEN ABANDONED
It shall be discretionary with the court whether to submit separate
questions with respect to each element of a case or to submit issues
broadly. It shall not be objectionable that a question is general or
includes a combination of elements or issues. Inferential rebuttal is-
sues shall not be submitted.
The court may submit special issues in a negligence case in a man-
ner that allows a listing of the claimed acts or omissions of any
party to an accident, event, or occurrence that are raised by the plead-
ings and the evidence with appropriate spaces for answers as to each
act or omission which is listed. The court may submit a single
question, which may be conditioned upon an answer that an act or
omission occurred, inquiring whether a party was negligent, with a list-
ing of the several acts or omissions corresponding to those listed in
the preceding question and with appropriate spaces for each answer.
Conditioned upon an affirmative finding of negligence as to one or
more acts or omissions, a further question may inquire whether the cor-
responding specific acts or omissions (listing them) inquired about in
the preceding questions were proximate causes of the accident, event,
or occurrence that is the basis of the suit. Similar forms of questions
may be used in other cases. 23
The most dramatic change effected by the revised rule is the abandon-
ment of the requirement that special issues be submitted distinctly and sep-
arately. The trial judge is now afforded wide discretion in the method of
submitting special issues. He may submit an issue broadly, even though it
includes a combination of elements or issues, or he may submit the issues
more narrowly, by listing and grouping the specific elements of the claim.
What is an issue? Justice Sharp, in Wichita Falls & Oklahoma Railway v.
Pepper, struggled for an answer, but after reviewing many precedents and
texts, could only conclude that "the decisions are in hopeless conflict. '24
A tremendous amount of skill and thought has not resolved the problem upon
the basis of any helpful rule. 25
22 R. McDonald, Comments on Certain of the Suggested Amendments to the Texas
Rules of Civil Procedure, at 12, April 18, 1949 (unpublished memorandum in Texas
Supreme Court Rules file).
23 TEX. R. Civ. P. 277.
24 134 Tex. 360, 368, 135 S.W.2d 79, 83 (1940).
2 5 See Freeman v. McAnnich, 87 Tex. 132, 135, 27 S.W. 97, 98 (1894); Jack Cane
Corp. v. Gonzales, 410 S.W.2d 953 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1967); G. HODGES,
SPECIAL ISSUES SUBMISSION IN TEXAS § 35 (1959); 3 R. McDONALD, TEXAS CIVIL
PRACTICE § 12.06.1 (rev. ed. 1970); Green, Identification of Issues in Negligence
Cases, 26 Sw. L.J. 811 (1972); Comment, Ultimate or Controlling Issues in Texas:
[Vol. 27
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Revised rule 277 should clarify this problem that has existed for six decades.
The rule now states that it shall not be objectionable that a question is gen-
eral or includes a combination of elements or issues. This is at the op-
posite pole from the former rule that required the issues to be distinct and
separate. Let us suppose a case in which the judge submits the issue, "On
the occasion in question, was the defendant negligent?" followed by the
question conditioned upon the first answer, "On the occasion in ques-
tion, was such negligence a proximate cause of the occurrence in question?"
Such a broad submission boggles the mind of Texas practitioners who have
lived under Fox v. Dallas Hotel Co.26 for half a century. On the other hand,
most jurisdictions would not regard such a submission as strange at all,
and it would seem that the revised rule would permit that form of sub-
mission. The alternative form for special verdicts suggested in the rule is
similar to the form employed by Wisconsin. Like Texas, that jurisdiction
approves both the "ultimate fact" verdict, which would embrace the first
broad form supposed above, and the alternate listing form, which it terms
the specific special verdict. 27 The Pattern Jury Charges Committee of the
State Bar of Texas has recently developed a revised form (included in the
pocket supplement to volume I of Texas Pattern Jury Charges) in keeping
with the second alternative method. 28  This form of the special verdict ap-
pears to be the one most favored in Wisconsin. 29
Practitioners rightly wish to avoid risking their client's rights and are con-
sequently concerned that the new practice leaves them with no "black letter"
precedents to which they might anchor. An analysis of the prior Texas sys-
tem, however, reveals three areas to which the practitioner might turn in
attempting to formulate the parameters within which he must now work.
First, there are the precedents, primarily in the personal injury fields of the
Special Issue Submissions, 25 TEXAS L. REv. 391 (1947); 10 TEXAS L. REV. 217 (1932),
listing four different meanings for the term.
26 111 Tex. 461, 240 S.W. 517 (1922).
27 It shall be discretionary with the court whether to submit such ques-
tions in terms of issues of ultimate fact, or to submit separate questions
with respect to the component issues which comprise such issues of ulti-
mate fact. In cases founded upon negligence, the court may submit
separate questions as to the negligence of each party, and whether such
negligence was a cause without submitting separately any particular
respect in which the party was allegedly negligent.
WIs. STAT. § 270.27 (1957). The Wisconsin statute has been construed:
Prior to the above amendment it was necessary in a negligence action to
submit separate questions concerning each respect in which it was alleged
that a party was negligent provided there was credible evidence to support
an affirmative answer. For example, it might be necessary to submit
separate questions with respect to speed, lookout, management and con-
trol, and failure to yield the right-of-way. The amendment authorized
the use of an ultimate fact verdict which merely inquires, 'At and im-
mediately before the collision was defendant John Doe negligent in the
operation of his motor vehicle?' followed by a causation question to be
answered in the event the negligence question was answered in the
affirmative.
Baierl v. Hinshaw, 32 Wis. 2d 593, 146 N.W.2d 433, 435 (1966). See also C. HEFT &
C. HEFT, COMPARATIvE NEGLIGENCE MANUAL § 8.30 (1971).28 See Appendix. The material contained in the appendix is taken from Sample
Charge "A" of the Explanatory Note in 1 TExAs PATTERN JURY CHARGES 11 (Supp.
1973).
29 C. HEFr & C. HEFT, supra note 27, § 8.30.
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law, which cut the issues very fine and which the new rule is obviously try-
ing to eliminate. Second, we have the precedents in the fields of law other
than personal injury, which have long permitted broader issues. And, fi-
nally, there are the precedents which for a period of time permitted the
submission of the broad issue inquiring as to the proper control of a ve-
hicle.
A. The Practice Which Rule 277 Rejects
Fox v. Dallas Hotel Co.30 declared the meaning of submitting issues
"distinctly and separately" as required by the legislature in 1913.31 Alex-
ander Fox died as the result of injuries he sustained while trying to operate
a defective elevator. In the action brought by his widow and children the
trial court separately submitted each group of issues inquiring into the spe-
cific acts of negligence on the part of the defendant Dallas Hotel. Only one
issue, however, was submitted inquiring into Fox's possible contributory
negligence, even though the plaintiffs had pleaded many specific acts. The
trial court simply asked whether Alexander Fox was "guilty of contribu-
tory negligence in his conduct in, around, or about the elevator, or the shaft
thereof, prior to or at the time he was injured?"'32  The supreme court re-
jected that broad submission because the statutes controlling the submission
of special issues made it "the duty of the court in trials by jury: First, to
submit all the controverted facts issues made by the pleadings; [and] second,
to submit each issue distinctly and separately, avoiding all intermingling
With Fox the course for negligence submissions was set.
84
Thirty-one years after Fox the supreme court restated the rule in Roosth
& Genecov Production Co. v. White.35 Lee White sued for injuries he suf-
fered in the collapse of an oil well drilling derrick owned by Roosth & Gene-
cov Production Company. He alleged more than twenty specific negligent
acts or omissions by the defendant; but the trial court, over objection, sub-
mitted the broad issue which asked if "such completed derrick, as it stood,
was defective at the time it was furnished" by Roosth & Genecov. 36 The
supreme court rejected the issue by reason of the Fox rule.
30 111 Tex. 461, 240 S.W. 517 (1922).
31 Ch. 59, § 1, [1913 Reg. Sess.] Tex. Gen. Laws 113.
32 111 Tex. at 476, 240 S.W. at 522.
33 Id. at 475, 240 S.W. at 521-22.
34 In Solgaard v. Texas & N.O.R.R., 149 Tex. 181, 185, 229 S.W.2d 777, 779
(1950), the full extent of the specificity required for negligence issues was realized when
the court stated that "each party is entitled to adequate presentation of all details of
fact supported by pleadings and evidence and essential to its own theory of the case."
(Emphasis added.) See also Kainer v. Walker, 377 S.W.2d 613 (Tex. 1964); Agnew
V. Coleman County Elec. Coop., 153 Tex. 587, 272 S.W.2d 877 (1954); City of Fort
Worth v. Lee, 143 Tex. 551, 564, 186 S.W.2d 954, 961 (1945); Walgreen-Texas Co. v.
Shivers, 137 Tex. 493, 154 S.W.2d 625 (1941); Wichita Falls & Okla. Ry. v. Pepper,
134 Tex. 360, 135 S.W.2d 79 (1940); Coleman v. Texas & Pac. Ry., 241 S.W.2d 308,
310 (Tex. Civ. App.- Dallas 1951), error ref.; Weidmer v. Stott, 48 S.W.2d 389 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1932), error ref.; 42 TExAs L. REv. 931 (1964); 8 S. TEx.
L.J. 142 (1966).
35 152 Tex. 619, 262 S.W.2d 99 (1953).
36 Roosth & Genecov Prod. Co. v. White, 257 S.W.2d 140, 142 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Texarkana), rev'd, 152 Tex. 619, 262 S.W.2d 99 (1953).
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The real significance of the opinion in Roosth is that the court exposed the
difference in the submission of negligence cases and the submission of cases
in other fields of the law. It cited some of its own decisions in recognition
of the fact that a narrow specificity was required in the former, while issues
which included a combination of elements or issues were permissible in the
latter. In other words, the court fully acknowledged that the same rule 277
had produced two different forms for the Texas special issue practice--one
for negligence cases and another for other kinds of cases.
Fox and Roosth symbolized the prior Texas special issue practice with its
excess of issues. The new rule 277 has attempted to revise that system by
providing that an issue may include a combination of elements or issues.
An understanding of the Fox-type submission will teach the practitioner
what the revised rule is attempting to avoid.
B. Precedents in Fields of Law Other than Negligence Law
We can now import into negligence cases the longstanding special issue
practice employed in non-negligence cases. This is what the court rejected
in Roosth. A study of some of the leading non-negligence cases reveals
that the narrow Fox submission was, in fact, the exception rather than the
rule.37
The city of Houston, pursuant to one of its ordinances, sued Mrs. Aneeth P.
Lurie for a declaration that two buildings owned by her should be con-
demned as serious fire hazards to life and property.38  The city alleged
numerous specific facts as to the construction, maintenance, condition, and
use of the buildings which would make the buildings fire hazards. Over
objections filed by Mrs. Lurie, the trial court refused to inquire into each
specifically alleged fact and submitted the case on only two issues.3 9  An
issue was submitted as to each building inquiring whether it "constitutes a
serious fire hazard to life and property. '40  Justice Smedley, writing for a
unanimous court, concluded that such submission was appropriate as it sub-
mitted "the controlling issues made by the written pleadings and the evi-
dence. '' 41 He reasoned:
The ultimate and controlling fact which the petitioner seeks to establish
in this case is that the buildings in their construction, present condi-
tion and use are serious fire hazards. The several specific allegations
that the buildings are dilapidated, of rotten material, cut into small
rooms and halls, . . . and the other specific allegations . . . are alle-
gations of matters of fact that fall within the scope of the ultimate
question. They are evidentiary in their character, being facts that
37 3 R. McDONALD, supra note 25, § 12.06.2; Pope, Broad and Narrow Issues, 26
TEXAS B.J. 921 (1963).
38 City of Houston v. Lurie, 148 Tex. 391, 224 S.W.2d 871 (1949).
39 Actually, there were four issues; however, the two issues inquiring as to whether
each of the two buildings could not "be repaired so as to no longer constitute a serious
fire hazard to life and property without undertaking repairs amounting to a sub-
stantial reconstruction of the buildings" are omitted from this discussion as irrelevant.
See Lurie v. City of Houston, 220 S.W.2d 320, 323 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston),
rev'd, 148 Tex. 391, 224 S.W.2d 871 (1949).
40 Id.
41 148 Tex. at 399, 224 S.W.2d at 876.
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tend to prove that the buildings are fire hazards, facts to be consid-
ered by the jury in answering the issues submitted. 42
In the divorce case of Howell v. Howell48 the Texas Supreme Court, on
certified question, was asked to determine whether the case was properly
submitted by the use of a single issue inquiring generally if the husband had
committed acts amounting to cruel treatment of the wife. 44  In approving
the submission, the court stated:
The issue to be determined is the total effect of the defendant's con-
duct considered in the light of all of the evidence. This in many cases
will require the jury to consider a number of facts, but a 'group of
facts' may constitute the ultimate issue rather than one single fact.
See Fox v. Dallas Hotel Co., 111 Tex. 461, 475, 240 S.W. 517, 522.
Where, as in this case, the one ultimate issue embraces a number of
subsidiary facts, it is not improper to include in the issue these several
facts, and a special issue so framed is not duplicitous. 45
An adverse possession case is also submitted with broader issues than
those dictated by Fox, as illustrated by Pearson v. Doherty.46  The appeal
in Pearson was based upon the contention that two of the issues were in
irreconcilable conflict. The first question inquired whether Pearson "had
peaceable, adverse and continuous possession of" the land in question and
whether he had been "using or enjoying the same for a period of 10 years
or more."' 47  The second question inquired whether during the same ten-
year period Pearson "was holding the land . . . adversely and in hostility
against the true owner." 48  The jury answered "yes" to the first question
and "He was not" to the second question. As the trial court had, in con-
nection with the first question, defined "adverse possession" as the actual
holding of the land with a claim of right "hostile to the claim of another,"
the supreme court held that the answers were in irreconcilable conflict.
Both questions were found to be inquiring as to whether or not Pearson
was holding the land with hostility as against Doherty, the holder of record
title. The significance of this opinion is found in the instructions that on
retrial the second question should be eliminated and an instruction substi-
tuted in its place which would tell the jury that, in order to answer the first
question in the affirmative, they must find that Pearson held the land "in hos-
tility to the claim of Doherty. '49
42 Id.
43 147 Tex. 14, 210 S.W.2d 978 (1948).
44 The issue approved was "Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence
that the acts or conduct of the defendant toward the plaintiff, if any, constituted such
excesses, cruel treatment, or outrages, of such a nature as to render their further living
together as husband and wife insupportable, as that term is hereinafter defined in this
charge?" "Insupportable" was then defined to mean "incapable of being supported, of
borne, unendurable, intolerable, insufferable." Howell v. Howell, 206 S.W.2d 616, 618
(Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1947) (Graves, J., dissenting).
45 147 Tex. at 17, 210 S.W.2d at 980.
46 143 Tex. 64, 183 S.W.2d 453 (1944).
47 Id. at 67-68, 183 S.W.2d at 454.
48 Id. at 67-68, 183 S.W.2d at 454-55.
49 See also Green v. Blanks, 342 S.W.2d 141 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1961), error
ref. n.r.e.; Mills v. Vinson, 342 S.W.2d 33 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1960), error
[Vol. 27
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In Hough v. Grapotte5° the plaintiff Hough, as executor of the estate of
George Galbraith, had to prove that Galbraith was domiciled in Iowa, a
non-community property state, when he purchased certain real property in
order to establish the separate nature of the property. The trial court sub-
mitted a single issue asking whether Galbraith was domiciled in Iowa on
the date the property was purchased, and then defined "domicile" as includ-
ing both the elements of residence and an intention to make the residence
his permanent home. In response to the proposition that the trial court erred
in not submitting separate issues as to each element, then-Commissioner
Hickman responded, "Multiplicity of issues should be avoided and only
those ultimate issues submitted which will form the basis of a judgment.
The issues of residence and intention are merely elements of the controlling
issue of domicile and were included in and disposed of by the answer to the
more comprehensive issue." 51
Finally, there is the case of Grieger v. Vega,52 wherein Mrs. Vega sued
Grieger for the wrongful killing of her son. Grieger answered with a claim
of self-defense. The trial court sent the case to the jury on only two ques-
tions, inquiring as to whether "the action of Fred Grieger in shooting and
killing the deceased . . .was wrongful" and as to the amount of the dam-
ages. Along with the first issue the court submitted an exhaustive definition
of "wrongful," covering forty-nine lines of the South Western Reporter. By
choosing this form of submission, the trial court avoided submitting the
many separate issues relating to self-defense, as requested by Mrs. Vega.5"
The supreme court, in upholding the trial court's conclusion that all the
elements of self-defense that are raised by the evidence should be included
in one instruction and submitted in one issue, concluded:
The method employed by the trial court of grouping several ele-
ments of an ultimate issue into one special issue is to be commended.
The ultimate issue in this case was whether or not the killing was
wrongful. The instruction was placed in the charge for the purpose
of enabling the jury to answer that particular question, and it was not
error for the court to decline to break down that instruction and submit
the elements of self-defense in the special issues requested.54
Although there has not been complete acceptance of the above approach,
there is a wide-ranging scope of the law which is committed to such a prac-
tice. 55 It is to this type of decision which the bench and bar can look to
ref. n.r.e.; Viduarri v. Bruni, 179 S.W.2d 818 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1944),
error ref. w.o.m.; 23 TEXAS L. REv. 190 (1945).
50 127 Tex. 144, 90 S.W.2d 1090 (1936).
51 Id. at 146, 90 S.W.2d at 1091.
52 153 Tex. 497, 271 S.W.2d 85 (1954).
53 The first requested issue "inquired whether or not at the time Arthur Vega was
killed he was making an assault upon petitioner; another whether the assault was of
such a nature as to produce in petitioner a reasonable expectation of death or bodily
injury; another whether petitioner used more force than was necessary in his self-
defense; and another whether petitioner had at his disposal other reasonable means of
repelling the attack then being made upon him, if any." Id. at 503, 271 S.W.2d at
88. See 34 TEXAs L. REv. 138 (1955).
54 153 Tex. at 504, 271 S.W.2d at 88.
55 Common law marriage: The court asked the jury whether there was a common
law marriage between George Brown and Merenda Brown, and instructed the jury that
1973]
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receive guidance from the past practice in Texas in submitting broader is-
sues in negligence cases.
C. The Proper Control Issue
There are also many precedents which developed between 1935 and
1965 during which time the broad "proper control" issue was tolerated in
automobile cases. Strangely, the issue was not attacked as being too broad
until Barclay v. C.C. Pills Sand & Gravel Co.55 The trial court had sub-
mitted issues which inquired whether the defendant (1) was driving at an
excessive speed, (2) was driving with defective brakes, and (3) failed to
keep its truck under proper control. A unanimous court found that the first
two issues were distinct and separate issues but the third one was too gen-
eral because it included the first two issues, and reversed the judgment be-
cause the plaintiff was not entitled to both a specific and a general submis-
sion of the same issues. 57 Of greater significance, however, was the disap-
proval of the further use of the proper control issue. Thus ended the prac-
tice which was leaning toward a broader submission of issues even in negli-
gence cases.
Four times previously the issue had reached the attention of the supreme
court without disapproval,58 and a number of specific matters had been rec-
ognized as falling within the ambit of "proper control."5 9  Although the
such a marriage required an agreement between unmarried persons, their living together,
and their holding themselves out to the public as husband and wife. Brown v. Brown,
256 S.W.2d 143 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1953), error ref. n.r.e. Child custody:
Fatheree v. Eddleman, 363 S.W.2d 784 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1962). Condem-
nation: The court submitted a single damage issue as to four separate remainder tracts.
State v. Oakley, 163 Tex. 463, 356 S.W.2d 909 (1962). Contracts: Defendant
contractor's issue asked whether the contractor was prevented from substantial per-
formance of the contract by the acts of the maker of the note or her agent. Kleiner
v. Eubank, 358 S.W.2d 902 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1962), error ref. n.r.e. See also
Houston Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Riesel Ind. School Dist., 375 S.W.2d 323, 328 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Waco 1964), error ref. n.r.e.; Sands Motel v. Hargrave, 358 S.W.2d 670
(Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1962), error ref. n.r.e. Workmen's compensation: "Do
you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff . . . sustained an
accidental injury to his body on or about the 30th day of July, 1938?" Maston v.
Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 160 Tex. 439, 331 S.W.2d 907 (1960); Eubanks v. Texas
Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 151 Tex. 67, 246 S.W.2d 467 (1952); Southern Underwriters v.
Boswell, 138 Tex. 255, 260, 158 S.W.2d 280, 283 (1942); Shirley, Special Issue Sub-
mission in Workmen's Compensation Cases, 18 TEXAs L. REv. 365 (1940). Wrongful
collection efforts: Issue approved which inquired whether the defendant, through its
agents, servants or employees made any unreasonable collection efforts against Mr.
Crit C. Lathram, from, on, or about May 1957. Employee Fin. Co. v. Lathram, 363
S.W.2d 899 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth), error dismissed, 369 S.W.2d 927 (Tex.
1963). See also Moore v. Savage, 362 S.W.2d 298 (Tex. 1962); Signature Indorsement
Co. v. Wilson, 392 S.W.2d 484 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1965), error ref. n.r.c.
See also G. HoDGEs, supra note 25, § 40 (1969 Supp.); 3 R. McDONALD, supra note
25, § 12.06.1.
56 387 S.W.2d 644 (Tex. 1965).
5 7 Texas & N.O.. Ry. v. Hayes, 156 Tex. 148, 293 S.W.2d 484 (1956); 3 R. Mc-
DONALD, supra note 25, § 12.09.1.
58 Triangle Cab Co. v. Taylor, 144 Tex. 568, 192 S.W.2d 143 (1946); Blaugrund v.
Gish, 142 Tex. 379, 179 S.W.2d 266 (1944); Schuhmacher Co. v. Holcomb, 142 Tex.
332, 177 S.W.2d 951 (1944); Northeast Tex. Motor Lines v. Hodges, 138 Tex. 280, 158
S.W.2d 487 (1942).
59 Operation of vehicle at a high and excessive rate of speed: Brown v. Vigeon, 367
S.W.2d 727 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1963), error ref.; Harrison v. King, 296 S.W.2d
344 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1956), error ref n.r.e.; Holly v. Bluebonnet
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proper control issue was out of step with the "distinctly and separately"
form of jury submission, the revised rule 277 should restore it or a similar
broad issue to the practice.
II. MORE EXPLANATORY INSTRUCTIONS
In submitting the case, the court shall submit such explanatory instruc-
tions and definitions as shall be proper to enable the jury to render
a verdict and in such instances the charge shall not be subject to the
objection that it is a general charge.60
Explanatory instructions should now replace many of the special issues
which were formerly employed in negligence cases. In looking for guidance
in drawing up instructions under our new system, the practitioner has two
available sources. First, he may look to the recent supreme court deci-
sions which, even though written under the old rule, were written with an
obvious intent to simplify trials. 01 Second, he would profit from a study of
the Wisconsin experience under a special verdict system which is very simi-
lar to that authorized by our revised rule 277.62 That jurisdiction also has
comparative negligence. 63 In Wisconsin a system has developed which
appears to give more emphasis to the correctness of instructions than to the
Express Co., 275 S.W.2d 737 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1955), error ref. n.r.e.;
Blaugrund v. Gish, 179 S.W.2d 257 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1943), aff'd, 142 Tex.
379, 179 S.W.2d 266 (1944). Failure to apply brakes: Shiflett v. Bennett Printing
Co., 330 S.W.2d 220 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1959); Holly v. Bluebonnet Express Co.,
275 S.W.2d 737 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1955), error ref. n.r.e. Failure to have
brakes in good working order: Schuhmacher Co. v. Holcomb, 142 Tex. 332, 177 S.W.2d
951 (1944); Fullingim v. Dunaway, 267 S.W.2d 483 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont
1954). Ability to stop within range of the headlights: Fullingim v. Dunaway, 267
S.W.2d 483 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1954). Operation of vehicle at such a speed
that could not stop within range of vision: Northeast Tex. Motor Lines v. Hodges,
138 Tex. 280, 284, 158 S.W.2d 487, 489 (1942). Failure to reduce speed: Harrison
v. King, 296 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. Civ. App.--San Antonio 1956), error ref. n.r.e. Failure
to reduce speed upon meeting blinding lights of an approaching automobile: Harrison
v. King, 296 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1956), error ref. n.r.e. Fail-
ure to swerve to the right: Holly v. Bluebonnet Express Co., 275 S.W.2d 737 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Galveston 1955), error ref. n.r.e. Failure to turn to the left: Triangle
Cab Co. v. Taylor, 144 Tex. 568, 192 S.W.2d 143 (1946); Holly v. Bluebonnet Ex-
press Co., 275 S.W.2d 737 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1955), error ref. n.r.e. Driving
vehicle upon the left side of the highway: Schuhmacher Co. v. Holcomb, 142 Tex. 332,
177 S.W.2d 951 (1944). Operation of vehicle too close to rear of another vehicle:
Triangle Cab Co. v. Taylor, 144 Tex. 568, 192 S.W.2d 143 (1946). Turning back
to the right before clearing a truck while passing: Harrison v. King, 296 S.W.2d 344
(Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1956), error ref. n.r.e.
60 TEx. R. Civ. P. 277.
61 Southern Pac. Co. v. Castro, 493 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. 1973) (substituted an instruc-
tion for the excuse issue); Adam Dante Corp. v. Sharpe, 483 S.W.2d 452 (Tex. 1972)
(eliminated the awkward open and obvious issue as well as most of the discovered
peril issues); Yarborough v. Berner, 467 S.W.2d 188 (Tex. 1971) (substituted instruc-
tions for the sudden emergency and unavoidable accident issues); Moulton v. Alamo
Ambulance Serv., Inc., 414 S.W.2d 444 (Tex. 1967) (eliminated issues as to mitigation
of damages); Dallas Ry. & Terminal Co. v. Bailey, 151 Tex. 359, 250 S.W.2d 379
(1952) (eliminated new and independent cause). See also Jackson v. Fontaine's
Clinics, Inc., 499 S.W.2d 87 (Tex. 1973); Green, The Submission of Issues in Negli-
gence Cases, 18 U. MIAMI L. Rv. 30 (1963); Green, Assumed Risk as a Defense, 22
LA. L. REV. 77 (1961).
62 WIS. STAT. § 270.27 (1957).
63 Id. § 895.045.
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refinement of the issues ;64 primary and contributory negligence issues are
submitted by a listing of the specifically claimed negligent acts or omissions,
and instructions then help the jury in answering those rather simple issues.
The common-law negligence system has been harsh to claimants and de-
fenders alike. A system which results in total victory or total defeat
when there is fault on both sides, has been the fertile field for the emergence
of a number of ameliorative concepts designed to make the system fairer.
There has thus been a spin-off of a number of satellite concepts such as
the no-duty issues, voluntary assumption of risk, attractive nuisance, sudden
emergency, imminent peril, discovered peril, excuse, the rescue doctrine,
and unavoidable accident. There are others. Some of these doctrines have
been analyzed and refined into a number of subsidiary elements or facets and
each has often been the basis for a separate special issue in Texas. The
new rule will probably eliminate the necessity to submit most of these
concepts by separate special issues.
Our adoption of comparative negligence law also presents some new prac-
tice problems. At common law, contributory negligence is a total bar to
recovery; not so, under comparative negligence. Voluntary assumption of
risk is an outgrowth of contributory negligence and it, too, is a total bar
to recovery at common law.0 5 A future decision must be made whether a
system which rejects contributory negligence as a total bar can retain vol-
untary assumption of risk as such a bar.0 6
III. Do NOT COMMENT-Do NOT ADVISE THE JURY
OF THE EFFECT OF ANSWERS
The court shall not in its charge comment directly on the weight of the
evidence or advise the jury of the effect of their answers, but the
court's charge shall not be objectionable on the ground that it inci-
dentally constitutes a comment on the weight of the evidence or ad-
vises the jury of the effect of their answers where it is properly a part
of an explanatory instruction or definition.6 7
The change in this part of the rule is guarded. The court may inci-
dentally comment on the weight of the evidence or advise the jury of the
64 C. HEFT & C. HEFT, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE MANUAL (1971); J. WINSLOW,
WINSLOW'S FORMS OF PLEADING AND PRACTICE ANNOTATED (1934); WISCONSIN JURY
INSTRUCTIONS (Conway ed. 1963).65 W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 68 (4th ed. 1971).
66 Jurisdictions which employ some form of comparative negligence are not in
agreement on this problem. Wisconsin treats voluntary assumption of risk as a subject
for instructions to the jury, rather than submitting separate issues, and treats the
common-law defense as a bar to recovery. Gilson v. Drees Bros., 19 Wis. 2d 252, 120
N.W.2d 63 (1963); McConville v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 15 Wis. 2d 374, 113
N.W.2d 14 (1962). On the other hand, voluntary assumption of risk is still a com-
plete bar in Arkansas (Schenebeck v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 291 F. Supp. 368 (E.D. Ark.
1968); J. Paul Smith Co. v. Tipton, 237 Ark. 486, 374 S.W.2d 176 (1964)), Georgia
(Henry Grady Hotel Corp. v. Watts, 119 Ga. App. 251, 167 S.E.2d 295 (1969)), Mis-
issippi (Dendy v. Pascagoula, 193 So. 2d 559 (Miss. 1967); Saxton v. Rose, 201 Miss.
814, 29 So. 2d 646 (1947)), and South Dakota (Raverty v. Goetz, 82 S.D. 192, 143
N.W.2d 859 (1966)). Substantially the same situation exists as to the last clear chance
doctrine.
07 TEx. R. Civ. P. 277.
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effect of the answers if the comment or advice is properly a part of the ex-
planatory instruction or definition. Comments on the weight of the evidence
and advice about the effect of the answers have been forbidden in Texas
since 1853,68 but there are still differences of opinion about the rule.69 The
revised rule accepts the premise that the design of the special verdict is to
elicit a statement from jurors concerning a disputed fact and that the ju-
rors' concern is not that of achieving a particular result.70
We can anticipate the use of many explanations and definitions in the
practice, but it would be well that we avoid the excesses in instructions that
once drove the Texas practice to the "distinctly and separately" rule. The
practice to which we must not return was one by which the judge would ar-
ray the evidence or the factual contentions of a party in an instruction, and
then add such instructions as, "if you so believe these to be the true facts
then find for the plaintiff,"'" or the defendant, as the case might be. That
practice is still unacceptable under the Texas special issue system.
Pittsburg Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Ponder72 epitomizes the rule prior
to the revision of rule 277, and it probably is still the rule. Ponder, who
operated a cafe, asserted two distinct grounds of recovery, strict liability and
negligence, in which she relied on res ipsa loquitur. She alleged and proved
that a bottle exploded, injuring her, while she was moving it from a storeroom
to a cooler behind a counter. The issue about strict liability was a simple in-
quiry about the reasonable fitness of the product. The explanatory charge
which accompanied the issue instructed the jury about the law of implied
warranty and told the jury that liability would reach the bottler under that
doctrine. The supreme court disapproved the use of the instruction be-
cause it was not "necessary" to enable the jury properly to pass upon and
render a verdict as the rule then required. The instruction probably still
cannot be used as, under the new rule, an instruction which incidentally
comments on the evidence or advises the jury of the effect of their answers is
tolerated if it is "helpful" to their understanding the issue. The instruction
about the legal effect of the implied warranty on the jury finding would
probably be improper under the new rule since it instructs as to the result
rather than the issue. Texas practitioners have had extensive experience in
preparing instructions which correctly omit the statements that a particular
belief or finding will lead to a victory or defeat for one of the parties.
68 An Act to amend the 99th, 130th and 131st sections of an act to regulate pro-
ceedings in the District Court § 1, [1853] Tex. Laws, 3 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS
1303 (1898); see Coles v. Perry, 7 Tex. 109, 140 (1851).6 9 Thompson v. Robbins, 157 Tex. 463, 473, 304 S.W.2d 111, 117 (1957); McFad-
din v. Hebert, 118 Tex. 314, 322-25, 15 S.W.2d 213, 216-17 (1929); Green, "Blind.
folding" the Jury, 33 TEXAS L. REV. 273 (1955); Gay, "Blindfolding" the Jury: Another
View, 34 TEXAs L. REV. 368 (1956); Green, A Rebuttal, 34 TEXAS L. REv. 382 (1956);
Annot., 90 A.L.R.2d 1040 (1963).70 See Grieger v. Vega, 153 Tex. 498, 502-03, 271 S.W.2d 85, 87 (1954).
71 Missouri, K. & T. Ry. v. Rogers, 91 Tex. 52, 40 S.W. 956 (1897); Missouri, K.
& T. Ry. v. McGlamory, 89 Tex. 635, 35 S.W. 1058 (1896); Western Union Tel. Co.
v. Jeanes, 88 Tex. 230, 31 S.W. 186 (1895); Houston E. & W.T. Ry. v. Lynch, 208
S.W. 714, 723 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1919); Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. v. Hamilton,
28 S.W. 906 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1894).




The revision of rule 277 rids us of the "separate and distinct" require-
ment and should bring to Texas a simpler special verdict practice. The
differences between the methods for submitting negligence and non-negli-
gence cases should now be put to rest. The rule permits the trial court to
submit the negligence and contributory negligence issues as the controlling
issues, or to submit these issues more specifically. Many of the satellite con-
cepts which surround the negligence practice will probably be handled in
the future by instructions rather than by special issues. The rule brings to
an end the need for submission of inferential rebuttal issues, such as un-
avoidable accident, sole proximate cause, independent contractor, and, in
some instances, borrowed servant. Whether voluntary assumption of risk
and last clear chance should be submitted by an issue or by an instruction
must await some future decisions. Finally, the trial judge is not permitted
to inform the jury directly of the effect of its answers, although indirect
comments will be permitted if the instruction helps the jury understand an
issue.
Hopefully, the new system will not slip back to the "separate and dis-
tinct" practice of the past. If we transfuse the old practices into the new
one, the submission of personal injury cases may again become laborious to
the point that the jury system will be endangered, and the public, in the end,
will be the losers.
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APPENDIX
QUESTION 1: On the occasion in question, was Don Davis negligent
in his speed, in the application of his brakes, or in his lookout? Answer
"Yes" or "No" on each line in Column 1. If any of your answers in Column
1 are "Yes," was any such negligence a proximate cause of the occurrence
in question? Answer "Yes" or "No" on the corresponding line of Column 2.





QUESTION 2: On the occasion in question, was Paul Payne negligent
in his speed, in the application of his brakes, or in his lookout? Answer
"Yes" or "No" on each line in Column 1. If any of your answers in Column
1 are "Yes," was any such negligence a proximate cause of the occurrence
in question? Answer "Yes" or "No." on the corresponding line of Column 2.





If any of your answers in Column 2 of Question 1 are "Yes," and if any
of your answers in Column 2 of Question 2 are also "Yes," then answer
Question 3; otherwise, do not answer Question 3.
QUESTION 3: From a preponderance of the evidence, find the percent-
age of the negligence that caused the occurrence in question that is attribu-
table to each of the parties found by you to have been negligent.
The percentage of negligence attributable to a party is not necessarily
measured by the number of acts or omissions found.
State the percentage opposite each name.
Don Davis %
Paul Payne
QUESTION 4: What sum of money, if any, if paid now in cash, do you
find from a preponderance of the evidence would fairly and reasonably com-
pensate Paul Payne for his injuries, if any, which you find from a prepon-
derance of the evidence resulted from the occurrence in question?
Do not reduce the amount in your answer because of Paul Payne's
negligence, if any. Consider the following elements of damage, if any,
and none other:
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a. Physical pain and mental anguish in the past.
b. Physical pain and mental anguish which, in reasonable probabil-
ity, he will suffer in the future.
c. Loss of earnings in the past.
d. Loss of earning capacity which, in reasonable probability, he
will sustain in the future.
Answer in dollars and cents, if any.
Answer:
